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Abstract. This paper focuses on a specific kind of (epistemic) normative
conflict, collateral normative conflict – viz., where cognition’s working badly
at the global level of general dispositions to believe is the price to be paid
for its working well locally. I argue that such normative conflicts aremuch
rarer than Williamson (2021) and Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) take them to
be, even though, and contra proponents of revisionary defeat (e.g., Brown
2018), knowers can, as Williamson and Lasonen-Aarnio rightly maintain,
at least sometimes disregard misleading evidence from reliable sources.
My rationale for the rarity of collateral epistemic conflicts draws from re-
cent insights by Sosa (2021) on the appropriateness of aiming, in certain
domains of inquiry, not just at knowledge, but at knowledge firsthand. A
consequence of the rationale offered, however, is that an entirely differ-
ent kind of normative conflict – what I call cross-modal normative conflict –
turns out to be much more common than appreciated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adilemma is a situation where all options are bad. An epistemic dilemma,
if such a thing exists, will presumably be a situation where all epistemic
options – viz., belief, disbelief, and withholding – are bad.
An epistemic option is ‘bad’ only if it violates an epistemic norm. So,
an epistemic dilemma (again, if there is such a thing) will at least be a
situation where all epistemic options involve the breach of an epistemic
norm.
Some epistemic norms govern belief. Here is an example: believe that
p only if you know that p.1 Assume, for the sake of argument, that that
norm is correct. If so, then – as one popular line of thought goes2 – we
should also accept derivative norms, norms that are then applicable when
we assess the agents whom the original norm governs.3 One such deriva-
1For some representative defences of this view, see, e.g., Williamson (2002), Gibbons
(2013), Littlejohn (2013), Swindlehurst (2020). For an overview, see Benton (2014).
2See Williamson (2016).
3SeeWilliamson (2021, 12). For amore detailed articulation of the relationship between
‘primary’ norms, that take the form: ‘do X’ and derivative norms that govern individuals to
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tive norm governs our general belief-forming dispositions: this derivative
norm says to manifest knowledge-conducive cognitive dispositions.
As Williamson (2021) points out, if you breach the belief norm, this re-
sults in a kind of ‘local failure’; this is because what constitutes the breach
is a defect in the belief, not a defect in the wider cognitive system. If you
breach the latter derivative norm, this results in a kind of ‘global failure’;
this is because what constitutes the breach is a defect in the wider cogni-
tive system, not a defect in the belief.
A properly working cognitive system that produces knowledge breaches
neither a local norm on belief nor a global norm on general dispositions
to believe.4 A careless guess that issues in a false belief breaches both.
What about ‘mixed’ cases? These are more complicated. As Williamson
says:
As theorists, we may feel ambivalent about the mixed cases, of
local failure without global failure, or of global failure without
local failure (2021, 7).
For example, we may feel ambivalent about whether to prioritise the
norm compliance that features in such cases over the norm breach, or
vice versa. Such ambivalence is part and parcel with the kind of normative
conflict that is characteristic of these global/local mixed cases.
However, importantly, it is a mistake to infer (i) that a situation features
a genuine epistemic dilemma5; from (ii) the fact that a situation features
normative conflict. As Mona Simion (Forthcoming) points out, a view on
which normative conflict arises can potentially give priority weighting to
one normover another in cases of conflict such that, in cases of normative
conflict, it might be false that all options are equally bad even if all options
involve the violation of an epistemic norm.
I am going to remain agnostic in this paper on the matter of whether
there are epistemic dilemmas in the strong sense that would not be im-
plied by mere normative conflict.6 However, I will attempt to say some-
thing new about normative conflict itself, which epistemic dilemmas – to
the extent that they exist – would entail asymmetrically. In particular, I
whom the primary norm applies, see Williamson (2016).
4For a substantive recent defence of this kind of picture, see Williamson (2017, sec. 4).
5See Hughes (2019).
6See, e.g., Hughes (2019), Littlejohn (Forthcoming), Leonard (2020), Worsnip (2016),
Lasonen-Aarnio (2010), and Ross (2010).
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will highlight two epistemologically interesting patterns of normative con-
flict – what I call oblative normative conflicts and collateral normative conflicts.
The latter will be the central focus, for the reason that – as will be shown
– it is contentious whether such cases actually feature any normative con-
flict at all. On the diagnosis of these cases by Williamson (2021) and
Lasonen-Aarnio (2010), there is (i) global/local normative conflict; and
(ii) the subject in the case knows. On the traditional revisionary defeat
diagnosis, there is (i) no global/local conflict, and (ii) the subject in the
case lacks knowledge. I argue both are wrong. A better diagnosis is that
such cases will – paradigmatically at least – involve no global/local nor-
mative conflict (despite appearances to the contrary), and that the agent
in the case knows. This diagnosis of such cases is implied in forthcoming
work by Ernest Sosa (2021). However, as I’ll argue, this kind of diagnosis
reveals how apparent collateral normative conflicts often enough present
a thinker with a very different kind of normative conflict, one between –
to a first approximation – norms that govern first-hand inquiry, and ones
that do not.
II. OBLATIVE AND COLLATERAL NORMATIVE CONFLICTS
Quality mismatches between global and local cognition give rise to what
appear to be normative conflicts (Williamson 2021, 8–10).7 Consider, for
example, the Preface Paradox: the author warns the reader in the preface
that the book will inevitably contain errors in its thousands of claims, each
well-researched by the author. This warning itself is made on excellent
supporting grounds about the probability of errors in a lengthy book. But
the author believes every proposition stated in the book (including the
warning in the preface), so at least one of the propositions the author
believes will be false and so not an item of knowledge. And yet, believing
all of these propositions, including those in the preface – rather than
withholding on any of them – seems to be exactly what manifesting good
(i.e., knowledge-conducive) general dispositions requires.
What what we find in the Preface Paradox is a ‘mixed quality’ case where
cognition is working globally well but locally badly.8 One interesting as-
pect of the Preface Paradox is that cognition’s working well at the global
level of general dispositions is not just accidentally related to cognition’s
working badly at the local level, on the occasion where it makes a mistake.
The connection is tighter: as Williamson (2021) puts it, in cases like the
7Mixed cases do not exhaust epistemic dilemmas. See Williamson (2021, sec. 5) for
discussion of local-local epistemic dilemmas.
8For the original presentation of this case, see Makinson (1965).
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Preface Paradox, cognition’s working globally well ‘actually makes it work
badly somewhere at the local level’ (2021, 10) – e.g., either the author’s
belief that the preface contains an error, or her belief that p, where p is
some claim elsewhere in the book, held on good evidence, but which is
false.9
For reference, call this kind of mixed case, represented by the Preface
Paradox, an oblative normative conflict, one where a local ‘sacrifice’ is the
unavoidable cost of manifesting good knowledge-conducive global dispo-
sitions.
Oblative normative conflict: A conflict in epistemic norms is an
oblative normative conflict iff cognition’s working well at the
global level of general dispositions to believe makes it work
badly somewhere at the local level of individual beliefs.
The converse of an oblative normative conflict is a mixed case where,
rather than good global quality requiring a sacrifice of local quality,
good local quality instead depends on there being bad global quality. Call this
converse kind of case a collateral normative conflict:
Collateral normative conflict: A conflict in epistemic norms is a
collateral normative conflict iff cognition’s working badly at
the global level of general dispositions to believe is the price to
be paid for its working well locally.10
Oblative normative conflicts, such as the Preface Paradox, never result
in knowledge. This is so even though they involve the manifestation of
good, knowledge-conducive dispositions.11
But what about collateral normative conflicts? Here things are con-
tentious. As we’ll see in the next section, some collateral normative
9This, at least, is Williamson’s assessment of the Preface Paradox. It would of course
not be a suitable reference point for distinguishing good global and bad local cognition for
one who already parts ways with Williamson’s approach to thinking about the case, which is
contentious. For some other representative viewpoints on the epistemology of the Preface
Paradox, see, e.g., Pollock (1986), Ryan (1991), and Douven (2003).
10Given that our aims in cognising are essentially local – viz., I am not reasoning for the
sake of reasoning, but in order to settle a question or gain knowledge – there is really no
‘sacrifice’ here. You ‘get the goods,’ unlike the case of obliative normative conflicts, where
you don’t get the goods because you are, as it were, reasoning in ways by which you would
usually get them.
11The idea that oblative normative conflicts never result in knowledge might look con-
tentious, but it is actually just trivial. If a subject does attain knowledge in a given case, then
the case wouldn’t be a case of local failure but local success.
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conflicts (hereafter: collateral conflicts) involve local success – compli-
ance with at least with a knowledge norm on belief – through withholding.
These are rare; they occur only when a default sceptic – already an
unlikely character – is lucky on a particular occasion to withhold.12 But
other collateral epistemic dilemmas involve local success qua affirming,
where that local success is predicated on the manifesting of a bad general
disposition. Prima facie, such cases will be more common. Arguably,
some such cases involve the acquisition of knowledge, despite apparent
global failure. This, at least, is the line that Williamson (2021) and
Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) take. Let’s now look at collateral normative
conflict cases more closely and see why the latter sort are especially
contentious.
III. COLLATERAL EPISTEMIC DILEMMAS: EXAMPLE CASES
General dispositions to believe that make up a cognitive system can fail by
being the sort of dispositions that churn out too many false beliefs. But
such global failure would also be implied by a system’s over-propensity
to forbear.13 Extreme gullibility and extreme scepticism are both global
failures; in both cases, a thinker is failing to manifest good, knowledge-
conducive general belief-forming dispositions.
One kind of collateral conflict occurs when the global failure is a failure
that consists in too often forbearing – and yet – it is only by that globally
problematic forbearance that one attains a local success.
Here is an example:
LUCKY BIV: Consider a brain in a vat – call it Betty – frozen
by sceptical doubts, and so frozen in what happens to be a
12As Nick Hughes has pointed out to me, while the default sceptic is a rare character,
taking a default sceptical attitude to certain specific domains of inquiry is less so. Take,
for example, the conspiracy theorist who takes, problematically, a default sceptical attitude
towards anything that is agreed upon by scientists, because this conspiracy theorist believes
the scientists are working together as part of a wider conspiracy. Now, add to the case that
on some claim, X, there is scientific consensus and X is false. (Perhaps: that jade is a natural
kind.) Here our conspiracy theorist, in withholding about whether X is true, generates a
collateral normative conflict structurally akin to Betty, even though the conspiracy theorist
is not an external world sceptic. Nonetheless, occasions like the above will not be very
common.
13I am using ‘forbear’ in line with Sosa (e.g., 2021, Ch. 3) as a genus of which withholding
belief is a species. While this is a natural way to think about the relationship between the
two from within a framework of performance-theoretic evaluation (which I embrace), the
langauge isn’t essential; the reader is free to treat the two as synonymous for the purposes
here.
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genuine sceptical scenario. Much like a non-envatted radical
Pyrrhonian might do, Betty asks herself ‘What if I’m really a
brain in a vat’14, and in response she forbears from belief : she
fails to form the belief that she is not a brain in a vat. Globally,
at the level of general dispositions to believe, Betty is func-
tioning badly; but it is because Betty functions badly that lo-
cal cognition works well by avoiding a false belief (by, in this
case, avoiding any belief at all).
In LUCKY BIV, Betty seems to comply with belief norms that a false belief
would breach – by forbearing when affirming would have led to a false
belief. At the same time, Betty breaches a norm that applies to the man-
ifestation of general dispositions: she manifests a bad global disposition
whereby she is frozen in a kind of sceptical paralysis.15
Compare LUCKY BIV now with a different collateral conflict – one where
cognition’s working badly at the global level of general dispositions to be-
lieve is the price to be paid for its working well locally, but where working
badly globally does not involve forbearing, and neither does working well
locally.
MATHEMATICIAN: A competent mathematician [Matty]
has just proved a surprising new theorem. She shows her
proof to several distinguished senior colleagues, who all tell
her that it involves a subtle fallacy. She cannot quite follow
their explanations of her mistake. In fact, the only mistake
is in their objections, obscured by sophisticated bluster; her
proof is perfectly valid. She puts her colleagues’ criticisms
out of her mind, goes ahead and believes that her proof is
valid, simply on the basis of her clear understanding of how
it works (Williamson 2021, 1, 10).16
Here is an interesting difference between LUCKY BIV andMATHEMATI-
CIAN. Betty withholds judgement. And, qua withholder, she is not a can-
didate knower; her success is just one of avoiding ignorance. But what
14This is a modification of a case presented by Williamson (2021, 10).
15As Williamson (2021) points out in discussing this kind of case: ‘In its past history, the
tendency may often have led it into a dead end, where it failed to acquire urgently needed
knowledge’ (2021, 10). Thus, a thinker with a general tendency to all-out sceptical paralysis
will not be a well-functioning cognitive disposition even if that system happens to be placed
in a BIV scenario where it’s withholding luckily prevents error.
16This description of MATHEMATICIAN is provided byWilliamson (2021) on both pp. 1
and 10. The discussion on p. 10 adds to the case that themathematician does come to believe
the target proposition, after putting the colleagues’ results out of her mind.
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about Matty? Might she know despite manifesting a failure of a general
disposition to believe?
Of course, some will be impressed by the apparent rebutting defeater
Matty acquires on the basis of her colleagues’ testimony. This suggests
a negative answer. However, a positive answer that explains away the ap-
parent rebutting defeater has been defended by, along with Williamson
(2021), Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) and Sosa (2021).
Let’s now consider whether the apparent merits of any of these positive
cases hold water, and if so, how this might require us to re-think the initial
assumption that the case features a global failure to begin with, and a
fortiori, any global/local normative conflict.
IV. THREE DIAGNOSES
The situation that features in the MATHEMATICIAN case is really a col-
lateral normative conflict (as LUCKY BIV is) only if the following profile
is accurate: (i) bad global cognition; (ii) good local cognition; (iii) nor-
mative conflict.
This ‘bad global/good local therefore conflict’ reading of MATH-
EMATICIAN is one that Maria Lasonen-Aarnio has championed in
various places (e.g., 2010; 2014) in discussing structurally similar cases.17
Lasonen-Aarnio offers the first explanation in the literature for why the
protagonist in a case like MATHEMATICIAN should be understood
as having not just any old local success paired with global failure but
knowledge paired with global failure.18 Lasonen-Aarnio’s view, applied
to the case, is that Matty is being unreasonable not taking into account
her colleagues’ testimony, even though it is misleading. However,
as she maintains, being unreasonable is compatible with knowing.
Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) writes:
[…] though reasonableness is connected with knowledge
in an important way, it is not necessary for knowledge.
Reasonableness is at least largely a matter of managing one’s
beliefs through the adoption of policies that are generally
knowledge conducive, thereby manifesting dispositions to
17This kind of result will also arguably be implied by Srinivasan and Hawthorne (2013).
18Lasonen-Aarnio’s assessment of ‘unreasonable knowledge’ cases (i.e., where knowledge
can be paired with bad global cognition) actually extends more broadly than cases like
MATHEMATICIAN – she includes cases of perceptual knowledge as well. For the present
purposes, I am focusing only on cases with a structure like MATHEMATICIAN, where the
kind of local cognition involves reasoning. The reason for this focus will be apparent in §5.
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know and avoid false belief across a wide range of normal
cases. Subjects who stubbornly stick to their beliefs in the
face of new evidence manifest dispositions that are bad given
the goal of knowledge or even of true belief. But we need
evaluative notions that can be satisfied without possessing
a general disposition to satisfy those notions. There is no
reason to think that knowledge is special in this respect:
sometimes being stubborn pays off (2010, 2).
Proponents of revisionary defeat, (e.g., Brown 2018) will, by contrast, pre-
sumably see MATHEMATICIAN as having an entirely different profile
altogether: (i) bad global cognition; (ii) bad local cognition; (iii) no
normative conflict. And, indeed, we find explicit arguments for this kind
of a diagnosis of MATHEMATICIAN from proponents of the ‘Defeat So-
lution’ to Kripke’s Dogmatism Puzzle.19 The debate surrounding that
puzzle attempts to explain in what sense knowing that p isn’t a license to
dogmatism, given that when one knows that p, one can presumably infer
via closure that any would-be counterevidence is misleading.20
I am not here going to weigh in on that particular puzzle. Instead, I
want to explore the viability of a third kind of diagnosis of MATHEMATI-
CIAN, which rejects both that Matty’s knowledge is defeated (contra the
defeat diagnosis) and, contra Williamson and Lasonen-Aarnio (hereafter:
WLA), that there must be at least one kind (i.e., global or local) of epis-
temic norm violation. The closest extant example of this third kind of
view appears in recent work by Ernest Sosa (2021Ch. 1), who describes
MATHEMATICIAN-style cases as featuring (i) good global cognition; (ii)
good local cognition; (iii) no normative conflict.
Thus, we have the following three distinct readings of MATHEMATI-
CIAN.
global local normative conflict
Defeat diagnosis bad bad no
Williamson/Lasonen-Aarnio (WLA) diagnosis bad good yes
Sosa diagnosis good good no
19See, e.g., Kripke (2011).
20See Kripke (2011) for the original formulation of this puzzle. For recent discussion,
see Beddor (2019), Brown (2018), and Lasonen-Aarnio (2014).
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A point of mutual recognition between the defeat diagnosis and the and
WLA diagnoses (despite their points of contention) is this: if a view rules
Matty knows that her proof is valid, then (given bad global cognition)
there would be global-local normative conflict.
But the Sosa diagnosis rejects this shared assumption. And that is because
on the Sosa diagnosis, where Matty can count as knowing the proof is
valid, there is not (despite initial appearances) any kind of global failure.
Matty is not violating any epistemic norms, global or local.
Unlike the WLA diagnosis that says Matty can know even though Matty
violates a global norm when Matty disregards the colleagues’ testimony,
Sosa’s diagnosis maintains that Matty can know the proof is valid and that
Matty positively should disregard the colleagues’ testimony. And that’s
why there is not really any normative conflict here, despite initial appear-
ances.
If Sosa is right about this, then this will generate a curious result about
collateral normative conflicts – again, cases where cognition’s working
badly at the global level of general dispositions to believe is the price to
be paid for its working well locally. The result that appears to be im-
plied by Sosa’s diagnosis of MATHEMATICIAN-style cases is that collat-
eral normative conflicts occur at most when cognition’s working badly at
the global level of general dispositions to believe is the price to be paid for
its working well locally by withholding (as in LUCKY BIV) – cases that will
already themselves be very rare. This would mean not only that there are
fewer collateral epistemic conflicts (there is no implication for oblative
epistemic conflicts) than Williamson and Lasonen-Aarnio would have it,
but it would also mean that proponents of revisionary defeat are – despite
wrongly predicting that Matty lacks knowledge – right (contraWilliamson
and Lasonen-Aarnio) that bad global cognition can’t issue in knowledge.
Given these interesting results that are implied by Sosa’s diagnosis, let’s
consider now the rationale for it.
V. COLLATERAL DILEMMAS AND FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE
Consider, specifically, the judgement Matty makes when she determines
the proof to be valid. She is at least affirming in the endeavour to get it
right about whether the proof is valid. But that is something Matty has in
common with those mathematicians who affirm that Goldbach’s conjec-
ture is true, even though they lack a proof for it.21 It is even something
21Goldbach’s conjecture states that every even integer greater than two is the sum of two
primes. Though it remains unproven, it is widely believed to be true. Famously, Euler, in
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Matty has in common with a non-mathematician who, while on a game-
show, simply affirms one way or another by guessing.22
Here is an answer that looks initially plausible: Matty, in judging the va-
lidity of the proof, aims not merely to get it right, but to get it right knowl-
edgeably. In this respect, Matty is unlike a basketball player chucking from
half-court – with the aim of making it no matter the risk of error – and
more like the player who assesses risk and takes a well-selected shot, aim-
ing not just to get it right, but to get it right aptly, viz., through compe-
tence.23 This is Sosa’s view.24 However, it’s not the full story.
Sosa thinks there is something special going on in cases like MATHE-
MATICIAN, something that bears importantly on how it is that we, by
judging, aim at knowledge in at least some domains of inquiry – those
driven by intellectual curiosity and not merely by practical ends.
In such domains, which according to Sosa include much of humanitstic
inquiry – including philosophy, logic and abstract mathematics – we aim
in judging not just to get it right any old way, or even to get it right merely
knowledgeably, but to get it right knowledgeably in – to a first approxima-
tion – a firsthand way.25
In this respect, curiosity-driven humanistic judgements – e.g., whether
Kant’s transcendental deduction is correct, whether the continuum
hypothesis is correct, whether Quine disproved the analytic/synthetic
distinction, etc. – are much more like the judgements we make when
attempting to fill in a crossword puzzle – where sheer deference un-
dermines one’s purposes – than they are like purely practical inquiries,
where knowledge acquired any way will do. Here is how Sosa elaborates
on this analogy:
responding to a letter from Goldbach in 1742 said, upon first seeing the statement of the
conjecture that he believed it ‘even though he could not prove it’ (Wang 2002, 4:1).
22For discussion of guessing, understood as affirmation in the endeavour to merely get
it right (any way) – see Sosa (2015, 74–75) and (2021, 25–33, 64–65, 96–90). Cf., Carter
(2016).
23For discussion, see Sosa (2010); cf., Carter (2020).
24For Sosa’s initial statement of this view – which gives judgement a central place in his
epistemology, see Sosa (2015Ch. 3). The view of judgement as constitutively aimed at
knowledge has been developed further – within a telic virtue epistemology, in Sosa (2021).
For the most recent presentation, see Sosa (2020).
25This line of argument is defended in detail in Sosa (2021Ch. 1). There are some
aspects of the argument, including what is for Sosa the role of intuitive insight, and the
role of understanding, that are important to his project, but which we can leave aside for
present purposes. For a very different picture of the role of first-person insight in perceptual
epistemology specifically, see Pritchard (2016).
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CROSSWORD ANALOGY: Consider two aficionados ad-
dicted to the NY Times crossword puzzle, one tries to solve
the puzzle with no external aids, and often succeeds. An-
other always waits for the answer to be published the next
day, then dutifully fills it in, and gets the solution exactly
right. Why does that seem so foolish? Because the whole
point of a crossword puzzle is to give you the amusement that
goes with a challenge that can be met but not too easily, one
that calls on your own resources and engages your attention
pleasurably. Both agents want equally to get it right, yet one
of them foolishly neglects the proper objective. Truth is a
part of the objective, but only a part. Attaining the truth by
just copying the right answer is not in the right spirit. Rather,
your aim must be not just success but firsthand success. In
that specific respect humanist judgements are like crossword
solutions. Indeed, given our broad understanding of human-
ist questions, crossword puzzles constitute a light humanistic
domain, where it is preferable and generally preferred to
reach one’s answers firsthand, not just through deference.
We saw earlier how humanist value judgements properly
engage one’s own autonomous competence. Proper delib-
eration uses testimony only as a conduit to reasons which can
then be accessed firsthand, adopted as one’s own, and deployed
through firsthand reasoning. Testimony can play that role
of conduit perfectly well, since the recipient need give no
weight to the word of the testifier as such (2021, 15–16).
If Sosa is right that in at least curiosity-driven domains of inquiry, we aim
in judging at knowledge unaided by sheer deference, then, as he puts
it, disagreement should not be as troubling, at least in these domains of
inquiry, as it is often taken to be.26 Compare: when an archer allows their
coach to guide their hands through the shot, they aim to hit the target
through this aid but the desire for firsthand performance is suppressed.
But this is not the case when the archer performs as a competitor. As Sosa
puts it:
There I dispense with external aids. I cannot defer to a
coach’s direct guidance as I draw my bow and prepare to
shoot. And this is so even if I still very much want to hit the
26For some views on which disagreement in philosophy and the humanities suggest that
we should accept at least some kind of agnosticism or scepticism in these areas, see Ballan-
tyne (2014), Carter (2018), and Feldman (2006). Cf., Goldberg (2013).
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target and know perfectly well that I could do so much more
reliably with the coach’s help! (2021, 15).
On the assumption that Matty – like humanistic inquirers, driven by cu-
riosity – aims at judging knowledgeably firsthand – she thereby, with this
goal, aims at attaining a kind of thing she wouldn’t even in principle
secure simply by deferring to her colleagues’ sayso (any more than the
archer, in competition, can attain their goal by shooting with the help of
a coach or another benevolent competitor).
Sosa’s view – if correct – licenses a bracketing of others’ say-so, at least
when one aims intentionally at judging knowledgeably firsthand – in the
sense that (as in other domains where firsthand performance success is
valued) ‘external aids that would boost competence must be shunned’
(2021, 15).
It should now be clear why Sosa’s view looks like it promises a way to ‘re-
solve’ what – if we assume like Williamson and Lasonen-Aarnio do, that
Matty has knowledge – would otherwise be an inevitable conflict between
global and local epistemic norms. Just consider that Williamson and
Lasonen-Aarnio both take Matty (and those in Matty’s position) to know
while nonetheless manifesting a bad general belief forming disposition.
According to Williamson, what’s bad is Matty’s ‘tendency to ignore criti-
cism from well-qualified sources.’ According to Lasonen-Aarnio, what’s
bad is that Matty (and those in her situation) is, ‘being unreasonable’
and by manifesting a ‘defective strategy for acquiring knowledge’ (2010,
16). Sosa’s line – while accepting that Matty knows (contra the revision-
ary defeat diagnosis) – denies that she is manifesting any bad disposi-
tion whatsover. Contra Williamson, she should ignore such criticism; con-
tra Lasonen-Aarnio, she is manifesting exactly the kind of strategy one
should manifest in the service of first-hand knowledge, even if this would
not be a good strategy for acquiring knowledge just any way.
VI. A FURTHER TWIST
Let’s summarise the key claims so far:
• Epistemic dilemmas and normative conflicts: Epistemic dilemmas, if
they exist, asymmetrically entail normative conflicts.
• Oblative and collateral normative conflicts: Two interesting patterns of
normative conflict are oblative normative conflicts and collateral
normative conflicts.
• Two kinds of collateral normative conflicts: Collateral normative con-
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flicts differ with respect to whether the local success that depends
on bad general cognition is a success in withholding or a success in
knowing.
• Collateral normative conflicts and knowledge: The latter kind of case –
represented byMATHEMATICIAN – is especially contentious. The
key dispute, between proponents of the revisionary defeat diagnosis
and the WLA diagnosis, concerns the matter of whether the case
features local success (knowledge) despite the manifesting of a bad
global disposition.
• Breaking past the impasse: If Sosa is right, both sides of this debate are
wrong, because MATHEMATICIAN features local success – knowl-
edge – without the manifesting of any bad global disposition.
• Ramification of Sosa’s diagnosis: Moreover, if Sosa’s diagnosis is right,
then this means that collateral normative conflicts are extremely
rare. They are limited to those (already rare) cases where a default
sceptical thinker generates a local success in withholding.
Does Sosa’s diagnosis of MATHEMATICIAN hold water? In this section,
I first show that his view withstands some anticipated objections; next,
I’ll propose a new twist: to the extent that Sosa is right, then (i) collat-
eral normative conflicts are indeed rare – and rarer than the WLA view
would have it; but – and here’s the twist – (ii) another kind of normative
conflict turns out to then bemuchmore common. This other kind of nor-
mative conflict pits against each other norms that govern modes of inquiry,
and by extension, beliefs and global dispositions under these (respective)
modes.
VI.a. Some objections deflected
Objection: If Sosa’s diagnosis of MATHEMATICIAN is correct, then Matty
is – rather than a knower who manifests a bad global disposition (i.e., to
ignore the colleagues’ testimony) – actually manifesting a good global dis-
position by ignoring the colleagues’ testimony. But this is a problematic
result even if we grant Sosa that in the kind of inquiry Matty undertakes
here, Matty aims at first-hand knowledge. One way to see why this is so is
to revisit Sosa’s archer analogy. Suppose an archer aims at firsthand suc-
cess, and in this way, aims to hit the target not through having her hands
guided by the instructor, and even if she appreciates that this would in-
crease the chance of success. Even assuming all of this, surely the archer
would be manifesting a bad disposition were the archer to – while in the
heat of the hunt – simply ignore all information from her fellow hunters
that bears on whether she will hit the target. For example, information
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about whether all the targets have already been eliminated in that area,
whether there are any nearby realistic decoys, whether a news update pre-
dicts high winds, etc. But if this is granted, it is less clear thatMatty, even if
aiming at first-hand inquiry, should – as Sosa puts it – bracket the (albeit,
misleading) testimony of her colleagues.
Reply: Yes, that would be a bad result, but on closer inspection, it can be
avoided. Here it is helpful to distinguish between: (i) knowledge on trust,
alternatively, through sheer deference; (ii) knowledge that depends on
the conduit to reasons provided by testimony. The former is of course
incompatible with knowing first-hand. The latter, though, is not. As Sosa
himself points out, a pupil might depend on guidance from a geometry
teacher in the course of coming to gain first-hand insight into a proof,
e.g., of the Pythagorean theorem. Here the pupil is being made aware of
reasoning that, as Sosa puts it, she can ‘thenmake her own,’ such that the
success of her judgement is a first-hand-success, not deferential success,
held just on another’s sayso.27 What goes for the pupil goes for the archer,
for whom we can distinguish accepting guidance in the aid of a first-hand
success, from, e.g., deferring to the hands of the expert when making the
attempt at that success.
Objection: But wait, if the archer and the pupil described can accept guid-
ance in the course of first-hand success – in the epistemic case, this will be
first-hand knowledge that depends on the conduit to reasons provided by
testimony – why is Matty doing something right by retaining her belief in
the face of her colleagues’ testimony?
Reply: Even a thinker who aims at first-hand knowledge might be led
to reconsider on the basis of another’s testimony. But the line being ad-
vanced here distinguishes between revising and reconsidering.28 The
claim, specifically, is that Matty – in aiming at knowledge first-hand –
may not only permissibly not revise simply on another’s say-so, but she
should not revise simply on another’s say-so.29 She should not do this
27Another example Sosa gives makes reference to the guidance one receives by Descartes’
in reading the Meditations. As Sosa puts it, ‘These are a record of the author’s meditations,
but they also serve, and are surely meant to serve, as a script for the reader’s own perfor-
mance. A main aim of the work is the enlightenment of the reader, not through deference
to the author but through guidance to firsthand insight and understanding’ (2021, 14).
28(Sosa 2021, 14).
29At least on Sosa’s line of thought, reconsidering is compatible with not revising. Take,
for example, two students, both of whom have established the proof of the Pythagorean
theorem on their own, in a first-hand way. The teacher, uncharacteristically, pranks the
students by telling them that they have gotten something wrong. The first student, recog-
nising the teacher as a reliable source of the kind of mathematical reasons that the student
14
any more than the pupil should accept the Pythagorean theorem’s proof
on sheer deference to the teacher, or the competition archer should then
succumb to external aids simply from hearing information that would af-
fect her performance first-hand.
Objection: Alright, though even if all of the above is granted, there remains
a problem, which is this: Matty, at the end of the day, is being irrational
in not revising (at all) in light of her colleagues’ testimony, testimony we
can assume ex ante that she takes to come from sources as reliable as she.
If this is granted, it is explained easily by, e.g., Williamson and Lasonen-
Aarnio’s assessment that Matty (despite knowing) manifests a bad global
disposition. But it’s hard to square with the idea that Matty is, per Sosa,
manifesting a good global disposition. Good global dispositions – in short
– surely exclude irrational asymmetry of epistemic treatment.
Reply: This objection can be defused for a subtle but important reason.
While asymmetric epistemic treatment that features in MATHEMATI-
CIAN would be irrational if arbitrary, it is not arbitrary here. It is
principled, given the assumption that Matty’s judgement is understood
as aimed at knowledge-first-hand, rather than knowledge any way. To
bring this point into focus, consider that the same asymmetric treatment
would be principled if the (misleading) contrary testimony was not
merely from her colleagues, epistemic peers, but from – say – Terence
Tao, Leonard Euler or from a superintelligence whom Matty regards
as infallible. Discounting, or bracketing, the say-so of these perceived
epistemic superiors is equally apposite to aiming at knowledge through
first-hand competence. Note, of course, that in this more extreme case
no less than in the original case, it is not at all that Matty would be
thinking, irrationally, that she is more likely to be right on the matter
than her colleagues, Tao, Euler, or the infallible superintelligence. That
thought, regardless of her aim in inquiring, would be irrational, and a
fortiori, would not plausibly issue from a good (knowledge-conducive)
might then adopt on her own, reconsiders her own reasoning—broadly analogous to how
a conscientious architect might look over their plans a final time before submitting. The
architect is not thereby in doubt of their own plans by reconsidering them. The final ‘check
over’ is not accompanied with agnosticism about whether the plans (checked over carefully
before) are right. The same goes with the first student, as she rechecks her proof. The
second student, suppose, is led by the teacher’s misleading testimony to reconsider also,
but also to revise. She is by contrast akin to an architect who cannot check her design, at
her superior’s suggestion, while still affirming it as a sound design. Sosa’s suggestion that
reconsidering is compatible with not revising is tantamount to the idea that it is possible to
be in the position of the first student, when reconsidering, and not always in the position
of the second.
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global disposition. Though, crucially, she’s committed to no such thing
in simply not revising.
VI.b. Normative conflict across modes of inquiry
If in judging whether something (p) is so – at least in certain areas in, e.g.,
the humanities, philosophy and mathematics – we aim not only to affirm
whether p knowledgeably, but to do so knowledgeably through first-hand
competence, then it looks as though collateral epistemic conflicts will be
comparatively rarer than Williamson and Lasonen-Aarnio would have it.
And this is because a significant proper subset of these would-be cases will
not involve local/global normative conflict of the sort anticipated after all.
They will involve local success and global success, which is the reading of
MATHEMATICIAN we’ve been considering, and which we’ve seen holds
up well under scrutiny.
But even if all this is right, another very different kind of normative con-
flict – for reference, cross-modal normative conflict – stands waiting in the
wings. This will be the focus of this section.
Let’s take as a starting point that not all inquiries are like Matty’s in-
quiry in mathematics and like humanistic inquiries more generally. Of-
ten enough, our judgements are attempts we make, by affirming, just to
know any way.30 Knowledge is the norm of the latter kind of judgement,
first-hand knowledge the norm of the former. What this means, then, is
that the matter of what norm (knowledge or first-hand knowledge) ap-
plies to a given judgement itself depends on whether ‘first-hand’ condi-
tions apply.
Let ‘F ’ represent these conditions, K F first-hand knowledge, and J F a
judgement aimed at K F . The ‘twin norms’ governing judgements of both
types are then:
(NJF): If F, you should (J F (p) if and only if K F (p)).
(NJ): If ¬F, you should (J (p) if and only if K (p)).
30For example, in considering whether a particular antique is valuable to sell – suppose
you care nothing about antiques and just want to maximise profit – you, in judging whether
to sell it by taking an expert’s word – affirm in the endeavour to do so knowledgeably, with
no concern to appreciate why the antique should be sold through a first-hand competence
to appraise the item, understand themarket, etc. To be clear, you are in judging not aiming
to, through affirming whether p, get it right any way – e.g., a guess, appropriate to getting it
right any way, would be inappropriate here – but to know anyway, first-hand or otherwise. If
your judgement issues in something short of knowledge, it then falls short, but it doesn’t
fall short if that knowledge is based on sheer deference.
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For both of these norms, (NJF) and (NJ), there will then be correspond-
ing derivative norms, norms that are applicable when we assess the agents
whom the original norm governs.
(D-NJF): If F, you should be disposed to (J F (p) if and only if
K F (p)).
(D-NJ): If ¬F, you should be disposed to (J (p) if and only if
K (p)).
Implied by the above picture is that, if F, then the norm governing one’s
global dispositions to believe is (D-NJF) and not (D-NJ). Matty is in F -
conditions ex hypothesi; though she violates (D-NJ), (D-NJ) is not applica-
ble to her. (D-NJF) is. But she doesn’t violate it.
Now, here’s the twist. Whether a thinker is in F conditions, when delib-
erating about whether p, very plausibly depends on her own orientation
to that question, which will itself be a matter of her intentions (and per-
haps other mental states). For example, it might very well be that it is on
account of Matty’s intentionally aiming at first-hand knowledge that she
is in F -conditions. Plausibly such intentional aiming suffices to place her
in these conditions.
A ham-fisted pragmatist, who affirms whether p when she does always
in the endeavour to affirm knowledgeably any way – viz., where sheer
deference will always do – will never be in F conditions, and so will be
governed in judging when she does by (NJ) and (D-NJ), never by (NJF)
nor (D-NJF). By contrast, the hero of Emerson’s Self-Reliance
31 might by
default be in F-conditions, and so will be governed in judging when she
does by (NJF) and (D-NJF), never by (NJ) nor (D-NJ).
Part of what it is, plausibly, to be a good inquirer is to know when to
be more like the pragmatist and when to be more like the hero of Self-
Reliance.32 I take this to be obvious. But, once it is granted, it is clear
that the very kinds of intentions that place us in F -conditions are them-
selves norm governed. For example, for some intention or mental state,
𝜙F that triggers F -conditions, for some conditions, C, the following norm
(and derivative norm) plausibly apply:
31See Emerson (1841). Equally, this kind of paradigmatically first-hand inquirer is
praised by Kant (1996) in his essay ‘What is Enlightenment,’ in which he proposes that,
when approaching any question for consideration, ‘Have the courage to use your own rea-
son.’
32Sosa (2021Ch. 2) suggests asmuch in his telic virtue epistemology, in which he discusses
intellectual ethics – where the norms govern not constitutive attempts we make at knowing,
but which inquiries we take up and to what extent we are prepared to close those inquiries.
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(𝜙F): You should (𝜙F if and only if C).
(D-𝜙F): You should be disposed to (𝜙F if and only if C).
We’re now in a position to define a cross-modal normative conflict. Sup-
pose (i) C obtains, (ii) you don’t form the intention or mental state 𝜙F;
thus, F -conditions are not triggered; and then (iii) you come to know
whether p on sheer deference. Here you violate (𝜙F) as well as (D-𝜙F), but
you comply with (NJ) and (D-NJ). Thus, we have normative conflict. The
normative conflict is ‘cross-modal’ because the norm compliance and
breach cross over different kinds of norms, norms that govern distinct
modes of inquiry. By this I mean the following: (NJF) and (NJ) (and their
respective derivative norms (D-NJF) and (NJF)) regulate what counts as
good judgement (and good dispositions to judge). (𝜙F) and (D-𝜙F) do
not. They regulate what counts as (put generally) good choices about
how to inquire (and good dispositions to choose how to inquire), which
is a matter of good intellectual ethics.33
Of course, even on the picture under consideration, we will still poten-
tially get old fashioned global-local normative conflicts. For example, one
might comply with (NJF) but not (D-NJF). In such a case, one – running
out of steam – lazily defers on some question of humanistic interest, but
despite doing so comes to know also through first-hand competence. Or,
one might satisfy (D-NJF) but not (NJF), as when one manifests a good
first-hand knowledge acquiring disposition, but is tricked in the partic-
ular case, and so fails to gain first-hand knowledge because she fails to
know at all. Likewise, one might comply with (NJ) but not (D-NJ) or
(D-NJ) but not (NJ).
Even so, what we do not find in this picture is any influx in collateral
normative conflicts, where bad global cognition is somehow ‘needed’ for
the local success. Such cases will remain rare. We don’t get one at all by
simply supposing someone knows first-hand while disregarding mislead-
ing testimony (remember, although Matty violates (D-NJ), (D-NJ) is not
applicable to her. (D-NJF) is. But she doesn’t violate it. Thus, no norma-
tive conflict, no collateral normative conflict). Granted, we would get a
collateral epistemic conflict on this picture in a situation where it is only
because a thinker succumbs (in F -conditions) to sheer deference that she
is somehow triggered to know in a first-hand-way. This is, while possible,
33For discussion of intellectual ethics – assessments of which are plausibly beholden to
some practical factors – as distinct from the kind of normative assessments in epistemology
that are centred around just truth and knowledge (arguably, sealed off from such factors),
see Sosa (2007, 89–91), (2015, 43–48) and (2021Ch. 2).
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much rarer than knowing first-hand and ignoring misleading testimony.
That said, it should be apparent that cross-modal conflicts are plausibly
not rare at all. We already noted one such situation, where in C-conditions
a thinker, inquiring in to whether p, fails to trigger F -conditions (i.e.,
does not form the intention or mental state 𝜙F), and then comes to know
whether p on sheer deference. In such a case, (𝜙F) and (D-𝜙F) are vi-
olated while (NJ) and (D-NJ) are complied with. Such cases will be no
rarer than cases where a crass pragmatist, inquiring into an ethical or
philosophical claim only in case such knowledge is useful on an exam –
gains such knowledge through sheer deference, e.g., reading from the
ethics textbook that ‘murder is wrong’ and simply taking the author’s
word for it.34 In a case where C -conditions don’t hold, we get a cross
modal conflict when a thinker, for example, refuses to accept testimony
– say, that a chemical is poisonous on the basis of a reliable chemist’s word
– holding out for knowledge-first-hand. Here you violate (𝜙F) and (D-𝜙F),
but, since you in fact do 𝜙F (even though C -conditions don’t obtain), your
forbearing from acquiring knowledge on sheer deference then complies
with (NJF) and (D-NJF).
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Collateral normative conflicts are rare. At least, they are much rarer
than some epistemologists would lead you to think when diagnosing cases
where a thinker who knows that p dismisses misleading evidence from re-
liable sources. But this point becomes apparent only through a better
understanding of the appropriateness of aiming, in certain domains of
inquiry, not just at knowledge, but at knowledge through first-hand com-
petence (e.g., Sosa 2021, Ch. 1). An implication of this wider picture,
however, is that a different kind of normative conflict (see §6.2) – one
that has flown under the radar – is really quite common, and that this is
so challenges us to think more carefully about the relationship between
norms that regulate (i) what counts as good judgement (and good dis-
positions to judge); and (ii) what counts as good choices about how to
inquire (and good dispositions to choose how to inquire).35
34It is worth noting that the idea that the thinker violates at least some norm here fits
snugly with diagnoses of, e.g, moral deference cases as discussed by, among others, Hills
(2009) andMcGrath (2009). For related discussion, see Enoch (2014) andMatheson, McEl-
reath, and Nobis (2018).
35Thanks to Mona Simion, Kevin McCain, and Scott Stapleford for comments on a
previous version of this paper and also to an audience at the University of Oxford’s
Epistemology Seminar (November 2020), hosted by Nick Hughes. This paper was writ-
ten as part of the Leverhulme-funded ‘A Virtue Epistemology of Trust’ (#RPG-2019-
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